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1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici curiae are scholars whose work is devoted
to the study of constitutional rights. Having researched the treatment of Second Amendment claims
and claimants in the Courts of Appeals as compared
to the treatment of those involving other fundamental
rights, they are interested in ensuring that the Court
has an accurate picture of the matter.
A list of Amici and their respective academic positions is set forth in the Appendix. 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In their effort to obtain a broad ruling on the Second Amendment’s scope, Petitioners and their amici
have sought to convince this Court that the Courts of
Appeals have systematically relegated the Second
Amendment to “second-class” status. The approach
taken by Courts of Appeals to interpreting the Second
Amendment, Petitioners contend, is “tantamount to
imposing ‘a hierarchy of constitutional values’ by judicial fiat.” Pet. Br. at 31 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982)). Various of their amici echo this sentiment. 2
1 All parties have filed a notice of blanket consent to the filing
of amicus briefs with the Clerk. In accordance with Rule 37.6, no
counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and
no such counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended
to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person
other than amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.
2 See Am. Civil Rights Union Br. at 2 (“This Court commands
that the Second Amendment must not be treated as second-class
constitutional right, but that is precisely what the Second Circuit
here—and other circuits as well—have done.”); Bradley Byrne &
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Petitioners and their supporters are incorrect. A
fair review of ten years’ worth of decisions applying
Heller and McDonald shows that the Courts of Appeals have acted with fidelity to the Court’s instructions. To begin, the Courts of Appeals have applied a
doctrinal framework that aligns not only with Heller
and McDonald, but also with the constitutional framework this Court has employed to review other fundamental rights. Next, an empirical analysis of Second
Amendment challenges reveals a success rate that
aligns closely to success rates for other challenges involving fundamental rights. And finally, review of the
cases Petitioners and their amici highlight in their effort to prove systemic judicial hostility reflect instead
a judicial effort to grapple with the difficult issues presented—all consistent with this Court’s instructions.
In other words, since Heller the Courts of Appeals
have treated the Second Amendment as a fundamental right.
119 Members of Congress Br. at 1 (action needed “to make clear
that the fundamental right to keep and bear arms is not a secondclass right”); Cal. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Br. at 2 (arguing Second
Circuit applied “scrutiny beneath the dignity of a fundamental
constitutional right” and that “(mis)treatment of the Second
Amendment is common among lower courts”); Liberal Gun Club
Br. at 4 (Courts of Appeals approach “incompatible with any individual right the Constitution protects”); Mtn. States Legal
Foundation Br. at 25 (contending Second Amendment has “second-tier status” in lower courts); NRA Br. at 4 (“any lesser form
of scrutiny [than strict scrutiny] would demote [the Second
Amendment] to second-class status”); Profs. of Second Amendment Law Br. at 2 (“lower courts have misused [a two-step test]
to treat the Second Amendment as a second-class right”); George
K. Young Br. at 6–7 (arguing that the “adequate alternatives”
test used in some Circuit Court analyses of Second Amendment
challenges would never be applied to other fundamental rights).
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ARGUMENT
In Heller, after confirming that the Second
Amendment “conferred an individual right to keep
and bear arms,” the Court declined to “clarify the entire field,” leaving the task of constitutional interpretation to the Courts of Appeals in the first instance.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 62829, 635 (2008). Since that ruling, the Courts of Appeals have faithfully sought to carry out the Court’s
mandate, reviewing the Second Amendment issues
presented based on Heller’s instructions. There is no
basis to conclude that the Courts of Appeals have
elided this Court’s instructions or relegated the Second Amendment to second-class status. As a result,
there is also no reason for this Court now to accept
Petitioners’ invitation to “clarify the entire field.” Id.
This Court should continue to leave doctrinal development to the Courts of Appeals in the first instance.
I.

The growing body of Second Amendment
precedent has adhered to constitutional
doctrine for reviewing fundamental rights.
A. Strict scrutiny does not invariably govern fundamental-rights claims.

To begin, the Court should reject the suggestion
by several of Petitioners’ amici that the failure to apply strict scrutiny in every Second Amendment case
demonstrates second-class treatment. The premise of
this argument is that fundamental rights invariably
merit strict scrutiny. 3 That premise is untenable.
See NRA Br. at 4 (“Because the Second Amendment is a fundamental, enumerated right, any lesser form of scrutiny [than
strict scrutiny] would demote it to second-class status[.]”); Profs.
3
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Strict scrutiny is not a universal feature of fundamental rights. Instead, this Court has subjected governmental conduct to strict scrutiny only when it implicates a limited set of rights—those found in the
First Amendment’s Free Speech, Free Exercise, and
Free Association Clauses, and in the Constitution’s
guarantees of due process and equal protection—and,
even then, it has done so only in limited cases. 4
Thus, the Court has applied a more relaxed standard of review in a number of cases involving these
same rights. “Gradations of scrutiny” apply to the review of the First Amendment right to free speech, depending on the speaker, the type of speech, and the
type of regulation. See Br. of Second Amendment Law
Profs. at 15–17; see also pp. 8–9, below. Other examples abound. The First Amendment’s Free Exercise
of 2d Amendment Law Br. at 5 (“[T]he refusal to apply strict scrutiny is striking.”); Bradley Byrne & 119 Members of Congress Br.
at 6 (“Generally, a government action that burdens a fundamental right . . . is subject to strict scrutiny.”); Cato Inst. Br. at 4 (“It
is . . . clear that an interest-balancing approach is usually inappropriate when it comes to . . . fundamental rights.”).
See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer,
137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019–20 (2017) (“laws that target the religious
for ‘special disabilities’ based on their ‘religious status’” (quoting
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533,
542 (1993))); Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198,
2207–08 (2016) (race-based classifications); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226–27 (2015) (content-based regulation of speech); Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of
Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 681
(2010) (noting “the strict scrutiny [the Court has] applied in some
settings to laws that burden expressive association”); see also
Timothy Zick, The Second Amendment as a Fundamental Right,
46 Hastings Const. L. Q. 621, 641–42 (2019).
4

5
Clause, for instance, protects the fundamental right to
practice one’s religion, but “neutral and generally applicable” laws receive reduced scrutiny even if they obstruct religious practices. See Trinity Lutheran
Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2020–21 (discussing Lyng v. Nw.
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)
and Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990)). Similarly, strict scrutiny sometimes applies to certain substantive due-process
rights, but others are subject to lower standards of review. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,
136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016) (“undue burden”). 5
Other rights do not trigger strict-scrutiny review
at all—those found, for example, in the Fourth, Sixth,
and Eighth Amendments—but these rights are no less
fundamental or “first-class.” Just this past Term, for
example, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s protection against excessive fines is “fundamental,” Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686–87
(2019), but the test for whether fines are excessive
does not require the narrowest tailoring between ends
and means, see United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S.
321, 334 (1998) (punitive forfeiture unconstitutional
only if “grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense”). 6 The short of it is that a failure to
See also Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2273 (2019)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“our precedents do not apply ‘strict
scrutiny’ to race-based peremptory strikes”); Sessions v. MoralesSantana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017) (applying only “heightened
scrutiny” for “‘gender-based classifications’”).
5

See also City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 763 (2010)
(“This Court has ‘repeatedly refused to declare that only the least
intrusive search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.’” (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
6
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apply strict scrutiny to firearms regulations could not
show second-class status.
B. The Courts of Appeals have adhered to
fundamental-rights doctrine.
Next, it is plain that the Courts of Appeals addressing Second Amendment challenges have applied
doctrinal tests consistent with this Court’s precedents. By and large, since Heller, the Courts of Appeals have applied an approach similar to the “twostep” framework the Second Circuit employed in this
case, asking, first, “whether the challenged legislation
impinges upon conduct protected by the Second
Amendment” and second, “determining” “the appropriate level of scrutiny” based on the answer. N.Y.
State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 883
F.3d 45, 55 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted). 7 This two-step approach accords with Heller
and this Court’s fundamental-rights precedents.
U.S. 646, 663 (1995))); Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 744 (2019)
(Sixth Amendment right to counsel violated only where “counsel’s representation [falls] below an objective standard of reasonableness” and the deficiency is “prejudicial to the defense” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 692 (1984))).
For other Courts of Appeals applying the test, see, e.g., Gould
v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 669 (1st Cir. 2018); United States v.
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v.
Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 678–80 (4th Cir. 2010); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of
Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives,
700 F.3d 185, 193–94 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Greeno,
679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651
F.3d 684, 701–04 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chovan, 735
F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d
792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010); GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia,
788 F.3d 1318, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2015); Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1252–53 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
7
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1. At the outset, it is plain that the Courts of Appeals have adhered to Heller’s reasoning. In holding
that the Second Amendment conferred an individual
right, Heller held that this right was “no different”
from the First Amendment, while making clear it was
“not unlimited.” 554 U.S. at 595, 635. The Court
acknowledged that the government may impose “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and
the mentally ill,” and that the individual right to bear
arms was no obstacle to laws “forbidding the carrying
of firearms in sensitive places” or “imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
arms.” Id. at 626–27. The Court also noted “another
important limitation”—the Second Amendment protects only weapons “‘in common use.’” 554 U.S. at 627
(quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179
(1939)). Thus, “weapons that are most useful in military service—M–16 rifles and the like—may be
banned.” Id. at 627.
From these observations it follows that, when confronting a Second Amendment challenge, the courts
should ask questions like “whether the challenged legislation impinges upon conduct protected by the Second Amendment,” what sorts of constitutional interests does the legislation implicate, and how “sever[e]”
is “the law’s burden on the right.” N.Y. State Rifle &
Pistol Ass’n, Inc., 883 F.3d at 55–56 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is entirely unremarkable,
therefore, that the Courts of Appeals have considered
the constitutional interests at stake when addressing
Second Amendment claims.
2. Next, comparing the Courts’ of Appeals Second
Amendment doctrine since Heller to this Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence shows that the Second
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Amendment has been treated “no different[ly],” and
indeed the doctrine has developed much like the way
First Amendment doctrine historically developed. See
Timothy Zick, The Second Amendment as a Fundamental Right, 46 Hastings Const. L. Q. 621, 660–75
(2019) (discussing doctrinal developments).
A two-step, Second Amendment framework that
considers the nature of the conduct in issue and its relationship to the implicated constitutional principles
conforms with well-established First Amendment doctrine. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 716–
729 (2012) (plurality op.) (applying similar two-step
inquiry to First Amendment challenge). Certain “utterances,” the Court has held, “are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.” Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). As a result,
some forms of speech receive little to no judicial protection. E.g., United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54
(1978) (perjury); Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)
(fraud); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973)
(obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–
49 (1969) (“incitement to imminent lawless action”);
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per
curiam) (true threats); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568, 573
(1942) (“fighting words”).
For other forms of speech, the level of scrutiny will
vary with the constitutional interests implicated—
ranging from truthful political speech that is at the
core of the First Amendment’s protections, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. C.t 1656, 1662 (2015)

9
(judicial campaign speech), to speech that receives judicial solicitude, but as to which the government has
more latitude, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561–66 (1980) (commercial speech); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504–14 (1969) (student speech).
And even speech that is at the core of the First
Amendment, this Court has held, may be subject to
“reasonable” restrictions on the “time, place, [and]
manner” of its exercise. Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 789–90 (1989). Such regulation as well
as incidental restrictions on core speech may be imposed without requiring the government to satisfy anything approaching strict scrutiny. Id. (“[T]he Court
of Appeals erred in requiring the city to prove that its
regulation was the least intrusive means of furthering
its legitimate governmental interests”); see also Clark
v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294–
99 (1984) (upholding restriction on camping in national parks as applied to protesters, whether viewed
as time/place/manner restriction or incidental burden
on expressive conduct).
In sum, Petitioners and their amici may not like
the flexible approach the Courts of Appeals have employed to review Second Amendment claims, 8 but that
Academics for the 2d Amendment Br. at 7 (“The practical
effect of the dual standard of review is to allow lower courts to
avoid any real application of the Second Amendment.”); Cato Institute Br. at 2 (“The lack of a clear standard of review has enabled—if not encouraged—the development of an unintelligible
and wildly divergent body of law.”); Firearms Policy Foundation
Br. at 10 (“[T]he lack of clear standards guiding and constraining
the lower courts was happily noted by the court below, as precursor to its dismantling of any meaningful protection of Second
8
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flexibility is a hallmark of the doctrine informing this
Court’s review of the very first of the individual rights
enumerated in the Bill of Rights. And in the Second
Amendment context, it is also required by Heller’s pronouncement that the Second Amendment is not unlimited, that it does not protect all weapons, and that
it specifically allows certain forms of regulation (like
felon-in-possession statutes). In this respect, the Second Amendment is no different from the First.
II. Success rates of Second Amendment claims
do not suggest second-class status.
Certain amici have also stated that the secondclass status of the right to keep and bear arms may be
inferred from the success rates of Second Amendment
claims. See, e.g., Cal. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Br. at 3–4
Amendment Rights.”); Gun Owners Br. at 22 (“Sadly, most modern federal judges . . . . read into the Second Amendment the subjective, flexible, judge-empowering word ‘unreasonably’ before
‘infringed.’”); NRA Br. at 10 (“The problem is with the balancing
inquiry itself—and the fact that the tiers-of-scrutiny framework
by its very nature enables judges, who in many cases do not
weigh the values at stake in the same way as the People who
adopted the Second Amendment, to override the balance the People struck and substitute their own.”); Cal. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n
Br. at 4–5 (“two-step” approach “affords courts multiple opportunities to tilt things in the government’s favor”); Commonwealth
2d Amendment, Inc. Br. at 20 (“Reticence to examine the Second
Amendment’s requirements, and the government’s consequent
automatic victory, has now been fully absorbed into the two-step,
means-ends scrutiny process.”); Gun Owners Br. at 7 (“‘[S]tep
two’ was designed to provide a lawful-sounding cover to authorize Second Amendment violations that appeal to judges.”); Mtn.
States Legal Foundation Br. at 12 (“[T]he two-step test is based
on a fundamental misinterpretation of a single paragraph in Heller, has allowed courts to inappropriately narrow the scope of
Second Amendment protected rights, and ignores this Court’s explicit prohibition of the use of interest-balancing tests[.]”).
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(asserting that “essentially every iteration of Second
Amendment challenge fail[s]” and that “only a few
lower courts have struck a firearm restriction as unconstitutional”); Commonwealth Second Amendment
Br. at 5 (contending that “[n]otwithstanding the fact
that the federal, state, and local governments comprehensively regulate every aspect of the possession and
use of arms, decisions holding such regulations unconstitutional are vanishingly rare”). An empirical review
of lower court decisions tells a different story.
The most comprehensive quantitative study of
which we are aware concludes the data do not show
second-class status. Professors Joseph Blocher of the
Duke University School of Law and Eric Ruben of the
SMU Dedman School of Law have analyzed every
available Second Amendment case between the date
Heller was decided and February 1, 2016—1,153
claims in total, in state and federal court, at the trial
and appellate level. See Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher,
From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the
Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 Duke
L.J. 1433, 1455 (2018). Ruben and Blocher show that
the supposedly low success rate of Second Amendment
claims “probably has more to do with the claims being
asserted than with judicial hostility[.]” Id. at 1507.
To begin, Ruben and Blocher demonstrate that
merely tallying Second Amendment “wins” and
“losses” results in an inaccurate picture. A majority of
Second Amendment challenges—742 of the 1,153 they
identified—were brought by criminal defendants
whose counsel, they observe, reasonably “might be expected to raise any nonsanctionable defense.” Ruben
& Blocher at 1507, see also id. at 1477–78. Indeed,
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nearly half of those (or a quarter of all challenges) involved felon-in-possession laws—a form of regulation
Heller held was “presumptively lawful.” Id. at 1507;
see Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26.
The success rate in civil cases, by contrast, is significantly higher, and it has steadily increased over
time. Ruben & Blocher at 1486–90; see also id. at
1507–08. Represented plaintiffs succeed more often
than pro se plaintiffs, and the success rate for represented civil litigants at the federal appellate level is
40 percent. See Ruben & Blocher at 1477–79, 1507–
1509. That is “well within the range of success rates
for other constitutional claims,” and far from the insurmountable odds Petitioners’ amici seek to portray.
Br. of Second Amendment Law Profs. at 22–23 (citing
studies showing success rates for other rights ranging
from 10 percent (regulatory takings), to roughly 12 to
16 percent (Free Exercise), and 39 to 52 percent
(Fourth Amendment)). 9
Amici Professors of Second Amendment Law cite two articles
that criticize Ruben & Blocher’s methodology. See Profs. of Second Amendment L. Br. at 32 (citing David Kopel, Data Indicate
Second Amendment Underenforcement, 68 Duke L.J. Online 79
(2018); George Mocsary, A Close Reading of an Excellent Distant
Reading of Heller in the Courts, 68 Duke L.J. Online 41 (2018)).
Both articles acknowledge that the success rate of Second
Amendment cases is driven in part by weak claims, see Kopel at
80; Mocsary at 43–44, and Mocsary acknowledges that claims
subjected to intermediate scrutiny (a test he has criticized) have
fared better than others, Mocsary at 44–45. Meanwhile, Kopel,
who does not analyze enforcement data in the context of other
rights, appears to assume that the Second Amendment is being
“underenforced” simply because he disagrees with certain decisions, including Teixeira v. Cnty. of Alameda, 873 F.3d 670 (9th
Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1988 (2019). See Kopel at 88.
9

13
What’s more, “Second Amendment claims have
had relatively high success rates in the courts that
have been criticized as giving the Second Amendment
right second-class treatment,” including by amici supporting Petitioners here. Ruben & Blocher at 1475; see
also id. at 1505. In both relative and absolute terms,
Second Amendment challenges have fared best in the
Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits. Id.
at 1475; compare Cal. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Br. at 2
(“the Second Circuit’s (mis)treatment of the Second
Amendment is common among lower courts” and the
Ninth Circuit is “perhaps the worst offender”).
For all these reasons, the Court should reject
amici’s assertion that litigation success rates demonstrate a systematic bias against Second Amendment
claims.
III. The Court should not credit conjecture
about judicial “hostility”.
Finally, the Court should discount the notion, advanced by certain amici, that a review of cherrypicked cases chosen by them reflects judicial “bias” or
“hostility.” 10 As just stated, a review of the doctrine
See Commonwealth Second Amendment Br. at 4 (urging
Court to “address the lower courts’ bias against the Second
Amendment”); Firearms Policy Found. Br. at 2 (“[i]t is no secret
that many federal courts . . . have been hostile to the point of
contempt toward claims under the Second amendment”); Gun
Owners of Am. Br. at 4 (asking Court to “put a stop to the open
anti-gun prejudice of many lower court judges, quell the open rebellion in the lower courts, [and] admonish their near-universal
rejection” of Heller and McDonald); Cal. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Br.
at 5–6 (claiming “the lengths to which courts have reached [to
find that challenged laws do not burden the Second Amendment]
confirms Amici’s suspicion of bias in employing the test); Liberal
10
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applied by the Courts of Appeals shows conformity
with the approach taken toward evaluating other fundamental rights, and litigation success rates are
roughly in line. Meanwhile, amici’s anecdotal evidence fares no better in establishing their thesis.
California Rifle & Pistol Association and their coamici, for example, cite the Third Circuit’s decision to
uphold New Jersey’s “justifiable need” requirement
for a handgun carry license as evidence of bias. Br. at
6 (discussing Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir.
2013)). In that case, they assert, the court supposedly
showed bias when it “pointed out that the list [of lawful restrictions in Heller] is not ‘exhaustive’ and that
being 90-years-old qualified the requirement for inclusion.” Br. at 6. But, in fact, the Third Circuit engaged
in an extensive discussion of the history of New Jersey’s regulation—as well as those in other jurisdictions—before concluding it was the type of “presumptively lawful” regulation Heller identified. 724 F.3d at
431–34. That mode of analysis is consistent with Heller, which stated that the scope of the Second Amendment should be determined by reference to historic
regulations. See Heller 554 U.S. at 626–27; see also
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010);
id. at 802 (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that “traditional restrictions go to show the scope of the right,
not its lack of fundamental character”).
Gun Club Br. at 18 (describing lower courts’ rulings as a “deliberate attempt to subject the protections of the Second Amendment to a death by a thousand cuts”); NRA Br. at 29 (“Judges
who think that Second Amendment’s ‘scope too broad’ have determined ‘on a case-by-case basis’ that in most every case that
the Second Amendment right is not ‘really worth insisting upon.’”
(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 634)).
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Amici also point to the Fourth Circuit’s decision
holding that Maryland’s assault-weapons ban is constitutional because the affected weapons are “‘like’ the
M-16 machine gun,” supposedly “ignor[ing] that the
rifles are lawfully owned by millions of civilians in this
country.” Cal. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Br. 6–7, (discussing
Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc),
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469 (2017)). Here again, no bias
is apparent. Instead, the en banc Fourth Circuit analyzed substantial record evidence that AR-15 pattern
rifles and other weapons banned by Maryland were,
in their design characteristics, sufficiently “like” M–
16 rifles to fall within the scope of Heller’s express
guidance that “weapons . . . most useful in military
service” may be proscribed. See 849 F.3d at 124–29,
135–37, 141–44; see also Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Heller II”)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“when legislatures seek
to address new weapons that have not traditionally
existed or to impose new gun regulations because of
conditions that have not traditionally existed . . . [it]
does [not] mean that the government is powerless[.]
. . . [T]he proper interpretive approach is to reason by
analogy from history and tradition”). 11
Both California Rifle & Pistol Association and
Commonwealth Second Amendment amici also attack
as “sleight of hand” or “moving the goal posts” the
Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in Teixeira that a county
zoning ordinance restricting the location of gun stores
did not burden conduct falling within the Second
As noted above, amici accuse the Fourth Circuit of “ignoring”
the widespread ownership of the types of firearm at issue, but, in
fact, the court addressed this point several times. See Kolbe, 849
F.3d at 135–36, 137 n. 11, 141–42.
11
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Amendment’s scope. Cal. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Br. 8–9
(discussing Teixeira v. Cnty. of Alameda, 873 F.3d 670
(9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1988
(2019)); see also Commonwealth Second Amendment
Br. at 18–19. Here again, a review of the court’s decision reveals no sleight of hand. Instead, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc conducted a seven-page analysis
of the text and history of the Second Amendment before concluding it does not “independently protect a
proprietor’s right to sell firearms.” 873 F.3d at 690, see
also id. at 681–689. Contrary to amici, Teixeira does
not remotely suggest the court would have upheld a
law “prohibiting gun stores altogether.” 12
With no actual proof of systemic bias, amici next
point to passing judicial remarks as evidence of supposed bias. They quote, for example, the Fourth Circuit’s comment that “[t]his is serious business” and
“[w]e do not wish to be even minutely responsible for
some unspeakably tragic act of mayhem because in
the peace of our judicial chambers we miscalculated[.]” Commonwealth Second Amendment Br. at 7
(quoting U.S. v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th
Cir. 2011). 13 But this sort of statement does not betray
hostility either. Heller and McDonald do not require
Indeed, before analyzing the appellants’ claim of a right to
sell firearms, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the Second
Amendment rights of prospective purchasers were burdened, see
Teixeira, 873 F.3d at 677–78 (agreeing that the right to keep and
bear arms necessarily includes the right to acquire them), and
concluded there would be no plausible impact, because another
store selling firearms was just 600 feet away, id. at 678–81.
12

See also id. at 7–8 (criticizing other judicial comments);
Profs. of Second Amendment Law Br. at 28–30 (similarly accusing lower courts of relying on public safety concerns when affording the Second Amendment second-class treatment).
13
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the courts to ignore the consequences of their decisions or the safety justifications governments may interpose to support regulation. See Heller, 554 U.S. at
626–27 (the prohibition against the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons” is an “important limit”
on Second Amendment rights); cf. Heller II 670 F.3d
at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (remarking that
“D.C.’s public safety motivation in enacting these laws
is worthy of great respect”). Again, First Amendment
doctrine shows that is so; courts have long considered
public safety and welfare in evaluating the scope of
constitutional protections for free speech. E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
In short, far from demonstrating a pattern of judicial “hostility,” many of the cases amici identify show
an effort to grapple with difficult questions, with fidelity to this Court’s guidance in Heller and McDonald.
The Second Amendment analysis that this Court instructed the Courts of Appeals to conduct calls for the
exercise of “nuanced judgments,” see McDonald, 561
U.S. at 803–04 (Scalia, J., concurring), and the available materials do not always point in the same direction. 14 That is what the cases show. They do not remotely evidence bias, let alone on a systemic basis.

See also Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1275 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[t]o be sure, analyzing the history and tradition of gun laws
in the United States does not always yield easy answers”); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012)
(“History and tradition do not speak with one voice here.”);
Drake, 724 F.3d at 430–31 (historical evidence relating to licenses to carry firearms points in multiple directions).
14
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CONCLUSION
There is no substance to the argument that the
Second Amendment is systematically receiving “second-class” treatment, and, indeed, an analysis of the
doctrine the Courts of Appeals have applied, and of
the results of Second Amendment cases, tends to show
the opposite. Review of the supposedly hostile cases
Petitioners and their amici cite as anecdotal proof,
meanwhile, demonstrates an effort to adhere to this
Court’s instructions and to develop the doctrine in the
way the Court instructed in Heller and McDonald.
There is, in short, neither occasion nor justification for
the Court to codify an unvarying standard of strict review for the Second Amendment. No such standard
governs any other fundamental right. And the Courts
of Appeals should continue to develop the doctrine as
they have, case by case, in the way Heller envisioned.
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